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THE TEXAS WIND ESTATE: WIND AS A NATURAL RESOURCE
AND A SEVERABLE PROPERTY INTEREST
Alan J. Alexander*
In 2011, Texas is again at the forefront of an energy boom: the wind energy boom.
In 2006, Texas surpassed California and became the US. state with the most in-
stalled capacity to produce wind energy, and Texas' level of installed capacity has
continued to grow. But the law has not kept pace with this growth. Similar to the
initial growth of the oil and gas industry in Texas, the wind energy industry was
also born, and continues to grow, in the absence of clear legal and regulatory
standards. Lack of regulation in the early development of the oil industry contrib-
uted to oversupply and rampant waste of oil. Similarly, lack of regulation of the
developing wind energy industry could Lead to wasteful practices regarding wind
energy development. This Note argues that the Texas Legislature should pass laws
clarifying that wind is a natural resource under the Texas Constitution, and that
to promote "[tihe conservation and development" of wind as a natural resource,
the Legislature should statutorily recognize wind rights as an interest severable
from land ownership.
INTRODUCTION
Texas has been at the forefront of the energy industry in the
United States for more than 100 years, following the discovery of
oil in Corsicana, Texas in 1894,' and then at Spindletop in 1901. As
such, Texas oil and gas law has followed growth in the industry to
become regarded as one of the most sophisticated such bodies of
law in the world. That courts outside of Texas often apply Texas
law to resolve oil and gas disputes exemplifies the national impact
of Texas energy law.3 Moreover, Texas oil and gas law often governs
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1. John 0. King, The Early Texas Oil Industry: Beginnings at Corsicana, 1894-1901, 32
J.S. Hisr. 505, 505-06 (1966).
2. See Cullen M. Godfrey, A Brief History of the Oil and Gas Practice in Texa 68 TEx. B.J.
812, 813, 815 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Walker Operating Corp. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 874 F.2d 1320,
1323-31 (10th Cir. 1989) (interpreting various points of Texas oil and gas law to affirm
FERC's jurisdiction over state pricing determinations); In re Arbitration Between Asamera
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agreements between foreign companies involved in oil and gas ac-
tivities," and is specified as governing law in choice-of-law clauses in
arbitration provisions for international oil and gas agreements.'
Similarly, many U.S. companies prefer to incorporate in Delaware
to avail themselves of the well-developed body of Delaware corpo-
rate law and the expertise of the Delaware Chancery Courts,
therefore positioning Delaware corporate law as the national mod-
el.6 Many U.S. companies engaged in international commerce
specify that the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York governs their contracts due to that
court's familiarity with international commercial issues.! Like Del-
aware corporate law and the jurisdiction of the Southern District of
New York, Texas' body of oil and gas law impacts states outside of
Texas. Texas is thus naturally positioned to develop a body of law
regulating wind energy which could serve as a national and inter-
national model and attract out-of-state parties to resolve disputes in
Texas courts.
The United States depends on fossil fuels such as oil for energy,
and has increasingly relied on importing oil from foreign countries
to satisfy its energy needs." Recognizing the potential hazards of
(S. Sumatra) Ltd. & Tesoro Petro. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1165, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (up-
holding an arbitral panel's interpretation of the "no greater estate" principal in Texas
mineral leases). The Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of the accommodation doctrine
in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621-23 (Tex. 1971), has been followed outside of
Texas. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thunderhead Invs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173 (D.
Colo. 2002) (following the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of the accommodation
doctrine in a dispute between a Delaware corporation and a Colorado corporation); Dia-
mond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Ark. 1974) (finding the Texas
Supreme Court's interpretation of the accommodation doctrine to be "very persuasive").
Mississippi courts have routinely followed Texas oil and gas law. See, e.g., Sims v. Inexco Oil
Co., 618 F. Supp. 183, 187-88 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Sw. Gas Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d
115, 122 (Miss. 1966).
4. ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSAC-
TIONs 68 (2d ed. 2000).
5. See Terri Truitt Griffiths & Timothy J. Tyler, Arbitrating International Oil and Gas
Disputes: Practical Considerations, in INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS VENTURES: A BUSINESS
PERSPECTIVE 187, 192 (George E. Kronman et al. eds., 2000) (noting the tendency of parties
in negotiating arbitration clauses of oil and gas contracts to specify Texas law as governing
their transactions). See generally Thompson & Knight, LLP, Choice of Law Considerations
when Drafting Arbitration Provisions for International Oil and Gas Agreements 1-17 (2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.tklaw.com/resources/documents/
Article%20-%2OChoice%20of%2OLaw%20Considerations.pdf (comparing the suitability of
English, New York, and Texas law in oil and gas agreements and concluding that Texas law
would be the more desireable body of law to address common operational disputes and
technical issues in oil and gas transactions).
6. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND AcquIsITIONs 6-7 (2d ed. 2009).
7. SMITH ET AL., supra note 4, at 68.
8. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America's Energy Future: The Future of Renewable
Wind Power, 26 VA. ENvrT.. L.J. 505, 505-06 (2008).
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foreign dependence, the United States is now looking to diversify
its energy sources.9 Wind energy" has become a popular option
given its renewable nature and the United States' potential to de-
velop wind energy facilities." Wind energy has various advantages
over traditional energy sources, including reduced fuel costs in
electricity production, reduced environmental harms attendant to
fossil fuel based energy production-namely natural resource de-
pletion and air pollution-and potential to provide a source of
economic growth for large swaths of rural America. 2 Moreover, the
United States has potential production capacity" in wind energy
sufficient to meet at least twenty percent of its domestic energy
needs, given the current state of technology and installed transmis-
sion capacity."
In 2011, Texas is again at the forefront of an energy boom: the
wind energy boom. 5 In 2006, Texas surpassed California and be-
came the U.S. state with the most installed capacity to produce
wind energy, and Texas' level of installed capacity has continued to
grow." But the law has not kept pace with this growth. Similar to
the initial growth of the oil and gas industry in Texas, the wind
9. See id. at 506-08.
10. Wind comes from the uneven heating of the Earth's surface from the Sun, which
creates areas of higher and lower atmospheric pressure. Cooler air flows into the areas of
lower atmospheric pressure, thus creating wind. Electricity is produced with wind energy by
erecting a turbine with attached blades, similar to an airplane propeller, above the ground.
Wind flows across the blades causing them to turn, which moves an electrical generator
inside the turbine and produces electricity. Modern turbines have the ability to adjust their
position with respect to the direction of the flow of the wind in order to maximize electricity
production. Id. at 517-18.
11. See id. at 519; see also Advantages and Challenges of Wind Energy, U.S. DEP'T OF ENER-
GY, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/wind.ad.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010);
Wind Energy Resource Potential, U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/
windandhydro/wind-potential.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
12. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 522-26.
13. For the purposes of this Note, "capacity" is defined as "maximum possible electri-
cal output." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 197 (2d rev. ed. 2000)
[hereinafter WEBSTER's DICTIONARY]. Thus, installed transmission capacity is the "maxi-
mum possible electrical output" that can be carried over existing power lines and related
power distribution infrastructure. See id. Similarly, installed capacity to produce, installed
production capacity, or installed generating capacity would be "the maximum possible elec-
trical output" that can be generated given the current number of functioning wind turbines.
See id.
14. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 522-26; Wind Energy Potential, AM. WIND ENERGY
Ass'N, http://www.awea.org/faq/wwtpotential.html#How%20much%20energy (last visited
Sept. 10, 2010); supra note 13 (defining installed transmission capacity).
15. See Drew Thornley, Texas Wind Energy: Past, Present and Future, 4 ENvTL. & ENERGY
L. & POL'YJ. 69, 69-74 (2009).
16. See id. at 75 (showing that as of September 30, 2008, Texas had 7113 megawatts
(MW) of installed wind energy capacity, well in excess of the 2537 MW of installed capacity
in California, and representing almost twenty-eight percent of the 25,410 MW of total in-
stalled capacity in the United States); supra note 13 (defining capacity).
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energy industry was also born, and continues to grow, in the ab-
sence of clear legal and regulatory standards." Lack of regulation
in the early development of the oil industry contributed to over-
supply and rampant waste of oil.'" Similarly, lack of regulation of
the developing wind energy industry could lead to wasteful prac-
tices regarding wind energy development. The risk is compounded
by the inexact application of developed oil and gas law to the legal
* * 19
questions surrounding wind energy.
Because wind is a renewable resource, wasteful practices in the
developing wind energy industry raise different concerns than
wasteful practices in the oil and gas industry.20 Nonetheless, wasting
wind is as harmful as wasting oil if the State aims to maximize the
use of its energy resources.2 Thus, to fully utilize the state's energy
resources, the State needs authority to regulate wind to mitigate
wasteful practices, and landowners need a legal property interest in
wind that they can market or develop and that courts will recog-
nize and protect.2 Yet under current law it is unclear whether the
State has full regulatory power over wind as a property interest sev-
erable from land, and whether wind ownership is incident to land
ownership. Addressing these issues requires resolving at least
three legal questions.
The first question is whether wind is considered a "natural re-
source" like oil or groundwater, such that the Texas Legislature
can pass laws to regulate it under the Texas Constitution. The
17. See Paul Santoyo, Laws Regarding Wind Energy Development Headed for Texas, SAN AN-
TONIo Bus. J., Aug. 24, 2007, at 24, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/
stories/2007/08/27/focus2.html.
18. See WILLIAM R. CHILDS, THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION: UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION IN AMERICA TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY 157-69, 199-228 (2005) (de-
scribing the history of waste in the Texas oil and gas industry from the 1910s through the
1930s due in part to the lack of an effective regulatory scheme, and also describing the ef-
forts of the Texas Railroad Commission as the agency charged with regulating the industry
to establish such a scheme).
19. See K.K DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral-Wind? The Severed Wind Power Rights
Conundrum, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 69,85-93 (2009).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
21. See Lisa Chavarria, Wind Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. B.J. 832, 835 (2005) (not-
ing that if the wind were classified as a natural resource, the Texas Legislature could pass
laws to maximize production of wind energy).
22. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part IIA-C.
24. Groundwater is defined in the Texas Water Code as "water percolating below the
surface of the earth." TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 35.002(5) (West 2008).
25. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a) ("The conservation and development of all of the
natural resources of this State ... , and the preservation and conservation of all such natural
resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the
Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto."); see also Terry E. Hog-
432 [VOL. 44:2
WINTER 2011] The Texas Wind Estate 433
26next question is whether wind is subject to ownership in Texas.
Wind could be subject to ownership in Texas under common law
by applying to wind one of four accepted theories of ownership:
the theory of groundwater, the theory of ferae naturae (wild ani-
27 28mals), the unified fee theory of ownership, or surface water law.
The final question is whether a landowner's interest in the wind
that flows over his land is severable from the surface estate." De-
spite a lack of legislative and judicial guidance on this question,
wind leases in Texas are typically written as if wind rights are sever-
able.so Yet it is unknown whether Texas courts will recognize the
31severability of a wind estate.
This Note argues that the Texas Legislature should pass laws
clarifying that wind is a natural resource under the Texas Constitu-
tion, and that to promote "[t]he conservation and development"
of wind as a natural resource, the Legislature should statutorily
recognize wind rights as an interest severable from land owner-
ship.2 Part I compares the initially wasteful history of the oil and
gas industry in Texas with the early development of the Texas wind
industry and discusses downfalls to wasting wind. Part II addresses
whether wind is a natural resource, the legal theories that could
wood, Against the Wind, ST. B. TEX.: OIL, GAS & ENERGY RESOURCES L. SEC. REP., Vol. 26,
No. 2, Dec. 2001, at 6, 11.
26. Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6.
27. For the purposes of this Note, "surface water" is defined as the water flowing in a
well-defined channel or watercourse such as a river, creek or stream. Cf Citizens Against
Landfill Location v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 169 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Tex. App. 2005)
(discussing the different categories of surface water in Texas). "Surface water" is not defined
in the Texas Water Code, but Texas case law defines two categories of surface water: diffuse
surface water and water in a watercourse. See id. A watercourse has the following characteris-
tics: "(1) a defined bank and beds, (2) a current of water, and (3) a permanent source of
supply." Id. The statutory definition of "state water" would include, inter alia, what this Note
defines as "surface water". See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 2008) (defining
"state water" as "[t] he water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river,
natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm wa-
ter, floodwater, and rainwater of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and
watershed in the state is the property of the state").
28. See Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-35 (D.N.M. 2009); Hogwood,
supra note 25, at 6-11 (describing possible legal theories in Texas law which could provide a
justification for wind ownership).
29. Lisa Chavarria, The Severance of Wind Rights in Texas 1 (Sept. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.sbaustinlaw.com/library-papers/Chavarria-
TheSeverance_ofWind.Rights%20(Final).pdf (revision of a manuscript originally pub-
lished as Lisa Chavarria, Undertaking the Severance of Wind Rights, ST. B. TEX.: OIL, GAS &
ENERGY RESOURCES L. SEC. REP., Vol. 32, No. 2, Dec. 2007, at 12).
30. Id. at 4 ("[C] onveyance of wind rights to individuals or entities who do not own the
surface estate has become a common undertaking by Texas landowners.").
31. Id. ("We do not, however, have the second part of the equation-the endorsement
of the law and with it assurances that a severance will be upheld.").
32. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
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support a property interest in wind, and whether any recognized
property rights in wind should be a severable property interest.
Part III argues that the Texas Legislature should enact laws clarify-
ing that wind is a "natural resource" under the Texas Constitution,
that there is a recognized property interest in wind, and that this
interest is severable. This Note concludes that clarifying wind en-
ergy laws will benefit the developing wind energy industry in Texas.
I. THE TEXAS ENERGY INDUSTRY
During the initial development of the oil and gas industry in
Texas there was little regulation of oil and gas production. This
history is analogous to the initial growth of wind energy in Texas,
since there is currently little regulation of wind energy production.
Without regulation, waste and inefficient production characterized
the early history of the oil and gas industry. This serves as a cau-
tionary tale about the potential to waste wind energy from
inefficient production practices if the wind energy industry devel-
ops without clarity regarding the Legislature's authority to regulate
it.
A. The Early History of the Texas Oil & Gas Industry
Texas energy law developed in the early 20th century to regulate
the state's booming oil and gas industry. In 1919, the rule of cap-
ture governed oil production in Texas." In Brown v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., the Texas Supreme Court defined the rule of capture
as "the right to produce all of the oil and gas that will flow out of
the well on one's land." 4 The court added that the rule of capture
"is limited only by the physical possibility of the adjoining land-
owner diminishing the oil and gas under one's land by the exercise
of the same right of capture."5 This rule inevitably led to overpro-
duction because property owners raced to drill as many wells as
would fit on their land and extract as much oil as possible from the
field before their neighbors tried the same. The rule of capture
33. See CHILDS, supra note 18, at 157.
34. 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935) (citing Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co.,
254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923); Hous. & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Prai-
rie Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 231 S.W. 1088, 1089 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921,judgm't adopted)).
35. Id.
36. See CHILDS, supra note 18, at 157. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (describing how pursuit of individual interests
leads to the overconsumption and depletion of communal resources).
434 [VOL. 44:2
The Texas Wind Estate
therefore encouraged unlimited production that led to waste in
the oil fields. To make matters worse, there were not enough
pipelines to transport all the oil that the fields produced." Thus,
oil was physically wasted because not all the oil produced could be
transported to market,9 and economically wasted because the
market was saturated, leading to artificially low prices.' This pro-
moted the physical and economic waste of a natural resource
rather than its conservation and optimal development. 4
The Texas Railroad Commission entered this landscape in 1919
and began passing regulations to control oil production. Its statu-
tory mandate charged it to promulgate rules to conserve oil and
gas and prevent waste. With time, Texas energy law evolved to cur-
tail waste in oil and gas production. The sparse regulation in the
early days of the state's petroleum industry contrasts starkly with
Texas' current oil and gas laws, which are robust, developed, and
sophisticated."
Examining the early history of the oil and gas industry in Texas
raises two concerns regarding the emergence of the wind energy
industry. First, it is unclear whether landowners have a property
interest in wind that they can seek to protect in courts and whether
the State can regulate wind. Without a clear property right, or the
ability to effectively regulate wind, wasteful practices in developing
and producing wind energy may emerge." Although the rule of
37. See CHILDS, Supra note 18, at 157.
38. Cf id. at 157-60 (discussing how correlative rights and prorationing orders re-
quired pipelines to take "proportionately from all producers [causing] more producers to
appear than would have been the case had they not had that assurance").
39. See Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 633 n.3 (Tex. App. 2000) ("Physi-
cal waste generally refers to the unnecessary flaring, evaporation, or other surface loss of oil
and gas or production practices that reduce or tend to reduce the total ultimate recovery of
oil or gas from any pool.").
40. See id. ("Economic waste refers to the drilling of unnecessary wells and production
in excess of reasonable market demand."); cf CHILDS, supra note 18, at 157-60 (discussing
how the rule of capture led to "unfettered production" and how correlative rights required
pipeline companies to take proportionately from every producer in the field, thus causing
more producers to appear than would have otherwise been the case).
41. See CHILDS, supra note 18, at 157-58, 202.
42. See Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 937-41 (Tex. 1935) (describ-
ing the delegation of regulatory authority over oil and gas to the Railroad Commission and
some of the early rules that the Railroad Commission promulgated after it was charged with
regulating oil and gas, as well as some of the laws the Legislature passed to the same end).
43. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws 286 ("It shall be the duty of the railroad commission to make
and enforce rules and regulations for the conservation of oil and gas ... ."); see CHILDS,
supra note 18, at 155-56.
44. See Godfrey, supra note 2, at 813-15; supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
45. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6-11.
46. See id. at 12 (arguing that absent legal protections, nothing currently prohibits a
neighbor from constructing a structure on his property that blocks all wind flow onto an
adjacent landowner's property); see also Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using
435WINTER 2011]
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capture provided a clear ownership interest in oil, an unregulated
market led to waste and inefficiency, and this cautions against al-
lowing wind energy to develop in a similar legal and regulatory
void.
B. The Emergence of the Wind Energy Industry in Texas
In some respects, wind is an older energy source than oil and
gas. There is extensive evidence that wind power has been used for
a variety of purposes over the past 2,000 years, including land
drainage, mining, and agriculture. Windmills were used to grind
grain and pump water in ancient Persia and China. During King
James's reign, windmills were used in London to grind grain, and
thus aided in developing the economy and food production.4 9 Alt-
hough the first wind-powered turbine for producing electricity was
invented in 1888,so the first commercially viable wind farms for
producing electricity in the United States were only established in
the 1980s.5'
The wind energy industry in Texas originated in 1999 when the
Legislature passed, and then-Governor George W. Bush signed into
law, the State's Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). 5The RPS ini-
tially called for the production of 2,000 megawatts (MW) of
renewable generating capacity by the year 2009 and defined "re-
newable energy technology" to include wind power.5 In 2006,
Texas met the initial RPS goal of 2,000 MW of installed renewable
generating capacity three years ahead of schedule, and surpassed
California to lead the nation in installed renewable generating ca-
pacity.54 In 2005, the Legislature amended the RPS to increase its
renewable energy production targets to 10,000 MW of installed re-
Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 207, 213-15 (2009) (stating that in
the absence of regulations concerned with the efficient placement of turbine sites, wind
turbine placement might underutilise prime development land).
47. Compare CHILDS, supra note 18, at 157-58 (describing waste in the production of
oil in the time before the Market-Demand Act when there was little or no regulation of the
industry), with Rule, supra note 46, at 213-15 (discussing the potential for lost production of
wind energy from turbine wake setbacks).
48. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 516.
49. See MICHAEL BOwLEs, GALE ON EASEMENTS 238 n.6 (13th ed. 1959).
50. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 516.
51. See Brit T. Brown & Benjamin A. Escobar, Wind Power Generating Electricity and Law-
suits, 28 ENERGY L.J. 489, 492 (2007).
52. See 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2598-99; David Hurlbut, A Look Behind the Texas Renewable
Portfolio Standard: A Case Study, 48 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 129, 129 (2008).
53. 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2598-99; Hurlbut, supra note 52, at 130, 132; see also supra
note 13 (defining capacity and installed generating capacity).
54. See Thornley, supra note 15, at 75.
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newable generating capacity by January 1, 2025.5' As of January
2011, Texas led the nation with 10,085 MW of installed capacity, 6
enough to fully supply electricity to more than two million Texas
homes.
The development of wind energy in Texas is reminiscent of the
oil and gas boom of the early 20th century. 58 Like the early Texas
oil fields, there is high demand for wind energy coupled with very
little restriction on the placement and construction of wind farms
and wind turbines. Yet rapid, unregulated growth in the early oil
and gas industry contributed to excessive waste of oil and gas.6
This cautions that rapid growth in wind energy development could
similarly lead to waste of wind and wind energy.
C. Wasting Wind
Because wind is a renewable resource, wasting it does not raise
the same concerns as wasting oil and gas." Unlike fossil resources
such as oil and gas that are lost forever when physically wasted,
wind is replenishable." Wasting wind, however, forgoes opportuni-
ties to harness the energy it provides. Such forgone opportunities
are known as opportunity costs in economics and are defined as
"the economic cost of an alternative that has been foregone
[sic]."" Rather than wasting a resource that can never be replaced,
55. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (West Supp. 2009); Hurlbut, supra note 52, at
132.
56. AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, U.S. WIND INDUSTRY YEAR-END 2010 MARKET REPORT 5
(2011), available at http://www.awea.org/documents/reports/4Q10_market-outlook
public.pdf.
57. See SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. AccouNTs, THE ENERGY REPORT
160 (2008), available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/pdf/96-
1266EnergyReport.pdf ("Texas homes tend to use more electricity than the average U.S.
home, since electricity[,] rather than fuel oil and natural gas[,] supplies most of the state's
residential and commercial-sector energy. In addition, hot Texas summers increase the
amount of electricity used for air conditioning. Consequently, in Texas a megawatt of wind
energy powers about 230 homes, compared to the U.S. average of 300 homes." (footnote
omitted)); Wind Energy Basics, AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, http://www.awea.org/faq/
wwt_basics.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) ("An average U.S. household uses about 10,655
kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity each year. One megawatt of wind energy can generate
from 2.4 to more than 3 million kWh annually. Therefore, a megawatt of wind generates
about as much electricity as 225 to 300 households use.").
58. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 833.
59. See Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1 ENvTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'YJ. 281, 282-83 (2007).
60. See supra Part IA.
61. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality-Finding Ways to Site
Wind PowerFacilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 635, 659-62 (2008).
62. See id. at 660 (noting that wind is an inexhaustible resource).
63. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & EcoNoMics 34 (5th ed. 2008).
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wasting wind represents an opportunity cost, in the form of the lost
chance to harness wind to produce electricity, or to do so in a
more efficient manner. This, in turn, forces society to forgo the
benefits of clean energy production and to rely on power pro-
duced from traditional sources, such as fossil fuel based power
plants.
Wasteful practices in harnessing wind energy take several forms.
First, inefficient siting, or placement, of wind farms away from are-
as that have optimal wind flow for electricity generation could
result from nuisance suits when neighbors sue to enjoin the con-
struction of wind farms to preserve scenic views from their
properties or from environmental litigation because wind farms
interfere with migratory birds' flight patterns." Also, turbine wake
turbulence65 can diminish the wind flow to downwind66 turbines if
windmills are clustered too close together, leading to lower electri-
cal generation at downwind windmills.7 In the absence of a judicial
remedy, upwind68 neighbors who consider wind farms a nuisance
could resort to self-help and install windbreaks along their proper-
ty line to diminish wind flow to their neighbors' wind farms.66 In
addition, with the legal status of wind severance in doubt, some
wind project developers are hesitant to work with landowners who
have severed their wind rights.70 While some landowners may pre-
fer to sell their wind rights to developers rather than enter into
long-term leases, the market for severed wind rights will not devel-
op without clarity as to whether severance is permissible, and if so,
64. See Brown & Escobar, supra note 51, at 493 ("Aesthetic and environmental con-
cerns have been some of the most commonly litigated issues stemming from the
construction and operation of wind projects."); Victoria Sutton & Nicole Tomich, Harnessing
Wind Is Not (by Nature) Environmentally Friendly, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 91, 103-15, 120
(2005) (arguing that wind farm siting should consider the harm wind farms cause to the
local ecosystem and migratory birds); see also Smith, supra note 59, at 290-97 (analyzing the
probability of success of nuisance suits in the context of both small scale and large scale
wind projects); cf Kristina Culley, Note, Has Texas Nuisance Law Been Blown Away by the De-
mand for Wind Power?, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 943, 961-67, 972 (2009) (discussing a failed
nuisance case against a wind farm in which the plaintiffs based their nuisance claim on aes-
thetic diminishment, vibrations, and noise).
65. Turbine wake turbulence is the downwind air disturbance and unsteady wind flow
caused by large commercial wind turbines. See Rule, supra note 46, at 208-09. This can re-
duce airflow to turbines up to half a mile away and make them less productive. Id.
66. "Downwind" in this Note means that something is located "in the direction toward
which the wind is blowing" from a given reference point. WEBSTERS DICTIONARY, Supra note
13, at 398.
67. See Rule, supra note 46, at 208-09, 213-15.
68. "Upwind" in this Note means that something is located "in the direction from
which the wind is blowing" from a given reference point. WEBSTERS DICTIONARY, Supra note
13, at 1438.
69. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 12.
70. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4-5.
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further clarity as to the rights that a severed wind estate carries with
respect to the surface estate and the mineral estate." These uncer-
tainties could stall some wind projects. Moreover, given the
traditional dominance of the mineral estate in Texas, potential
wind energy projects may be sidelined if they conflict with mineral
extraction projects on the same tract of land.73 Without the author-
ity to conserve wind as a natural resource, the Legislature's ability
to resolve these issues is dubious; without a property right in wind,
landowners have no cognizable or protectable interest in which to
invest; and without clarity regarding wind severance, some projects
will simply not proceed. The current state of the law forces society
to forgo wind energy production in favor of power from traditional
sources, which have harmful effects on air quality and possibly con-
tribute to anthropogenic climate change."
Once wind is harnessed and converted into electricity, wind en-
ergy may be subject to both physical and economic waste. Physical
waste of wind energy could result from transmission constraints,
production variability, and inefficient storage.76 Transmission con-
straints could prevent wind energy that is produced in rural areas
from being delivered to customers in urban areas. Additionally,
the wind could blow and produce electricity at times when such
71. See id.
72. "In Texas the owner of land owns the oil, gas, and other minerals beneath the land
in fee simple. If ownership of the minerals is severed from ownership of the surface, two
separate fees simple result." 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TExAS LAW OF
OIL AND GAS § 2.1(A), at 2-3 (2d ed. 2009) (footnote omitted) (citing Tex. Co. v. Daugh-
erty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915)). Thus the mineral estate comprises the minerals below the
surface of the estate. SeeJOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 38-42 (5th ed.
2009) (describing severance and the mineral interest in oil and gas law).
73. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 840. See generally K. DuVivier & Roderick E. Wet-
sel, Jousting at Windmills: VWen Wind Power Development Collides with Oil, Gas, and Mineral
Development, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 9.03, at 9-9 to -12 (2009).
74. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834-35, 837, 840 (discussing (1) the Legislature's
ability to assure orderly development of wind power if the wind is classified as a natural re-
source; (2) the lack of clarity on the issue of wind ownership, but concluding that wind
ownership is incident to the surface estate; (3) the lack of clarity on the issue of severance,
but describing the contours and rights that a wind estate could entail); Chavarria, supra note
29, at 4-5 (discussing some effects of the lack of clarity on the issue of wind severance and
warning that, due to this lack of clarity, caution is warranted when undertaking severance).
75. See Melanie McCammon, Note, Environmental Perspectives on Siting Wind Farms: Is
GreaterFederal Control Warranted, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1243, 1275-78 (2009) (discussing the
unmet demand for wind energy as one of the externalities that society bears when local
interests dictate wind farm siting decisions); see also Rosenberg, supra note 61, at 658-70
(discussing the pros and cons of wind power that could affect siting decisions).
76. See Thornley, supra note 15, at 75-94.
77. See, e.g., Hurlbut, supra note 52, at 136; see also Ryan Thomas Trahan, Note &
Comment, Social and Regulatory Control of Wind Energy-An Empirical Survey of Texas and Kan-
sas, 4 TEX.J. OIL GAs & ENERGY L. 89, 93 (2008).
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electricity is not in demand." If large-scale storage of electricity
were possible, electricity could be stored until it is needed, but
there currently are no feasible means of storing excess electricity.7
Economic waste of wind energy could occur in situations where the
market for wind energy becomes saturated, perhaps due to gov-
ernment subsidies for renewable energy."0 This would lead to
artificially low electricity prices, and would hamper the future de-
velopment of wind energy projects once the subsidies are
removed."' Regulation of wind energy can prevent these actual and
potential forms of waste.
To avoid wasting wind and to promote future growth in wind
energy production, the Legislature needs authority to regulate
wind as a natural resource, and landowners need a legally recog-
nized and protected property interest in wind." Achieving this
requires clarifying the legal questions that lawmakers have largely
avoided over the last ten years. In Texas, is wind a natural resource
like groundwater and petroleum? Is wind subject to ownership? If
so, is wind also subject to the rule of capture? If wind ownership is
incident to property ownership, are wind rights severable?83 The
Texas wind energy industry has grown tremendously despite these
unsettled questions, and parties to wind leases commonly adopt
the position that the wind estate is severable from the surface es-
tate.85 This severability implies that wind is a resource incident to
land ownership that property owners are free to exploit, much like
petroleum, groundwater, and other minerals. Nonetheless, while
severance of wind rights from the surface estate has become com-
78. Cf CoMBs, supra note 57, at 167 ("When the wind blows hard and wind turbines
produce more electricity than the grid can accommodate, the producers in West Texas shut
down the wind turbines.").
79. See Thomley, supra note 15, at 84-88.
80. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (authorizing a production tax credit for renewable
energy production); see also Thomley, supra note 15, at 101-11 (discussing various wind
power subsidiy programs at the federal, state, and local levels).
81. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834 ("Congress has consistently allowed the [pro-
duction tax credit] to expire, only to renew it, causing boom and bust cycles in the wind
industry.").
82. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
83. See TEx. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., CAPTURING THE
WIND: THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW ENERGY SOURCE IN TEXAS 17-18 (2008) [hereinafter
HOUSE RESEARCH ORG.], available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/Wind8-9.pdf;
Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834-40; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6-13.
84. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
85. Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 11.
86. See Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct.
App. 1997); Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6-10.
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mon practice,87 neither Texas' Legislature nor its courts have spo-
ken to the issue of severability."
Recognizing that growth in wind energy will continue, the Texas
Legislature should consider the history of the oil and gas industry
and act immediately to avoid wasted opportunities to develop wind
energy. Wind's status as a natural resource subject to regulation
must be codified. This will allow the Legislature to mitigate waste-
ful practices in the harvest of wind. Clarifying that wind is a natural
resource will allow the Legislature to pass laws confirming the
landowner's interest in the wind blowing over his property. This
will affirmatively recognize wind as a form of property in which the
landowner can invest and develop by constructing windmills. Final-
ly, statutorily allowing for the severability of wind rights will clear
up existing doubts as to the viability of this practice, enable land-
owners to transfer or sell their wind rights without losing their
surface estate, and will afford landowners protection beyond what
89
they are currently able to negotiate in wind leases.
II. WIND: A NATURAL RESOURCE AND A SEVERABLE
PROPERTY INTEREST
The first area of uncertainty in current wind energy law is
whether wind is a natural resource that is subject to regulation un-
der Texas' constitutional framework. The answer to this question
affects the viability of various theories of property ownership that
serve as rationales for recognizing a property interest in wind. The
law underlying the ownership of groundwater provides the most
useful analogy for recognizing a property interest in wind, but this
Note will also discuss other potential theories of wind ownership
that scholars have proposed. Finally, before deciding whether wind
87. Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4.
88. Id. at 1, 4.
89. In addition to the policy goal of promoting growth in wind energy, it is also worth
considering that, at present, the main protection landowners have over their wind rights
comes in the form of provisions in contractual agreements with wind farm developers. See
HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 83, at 18. Yet some landowners may not have the sophis-
tication or the resources to navigate the negotiation and drafting of a wind lease. While
there are many qualified attorneys who have experience drafting wind leases, contracting an
attorney may be out of the reach of some landowners. Statutory clarifications defining the
wind rights of landowners would provide protection outside of the landowner's ability to
bargain and draft a wind lease. See id.; see alsoJoseph 0. Wilson, Note, The Answer, My Friends,
Is in the Wind Rights Contract Act: Proposed Legislation Governing Wind Rights Contracts, 89 IOWA
L. REv. 1775, 1785-99 (2004) (addressing some of the considerations in a wind lease, and
proposing legislation to standardize wind leases and contractual agreements, in part for the
benefit of landowners who must negotiate long-term contracts with wind developers).
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interests are severable from the surface, it is important to consider
whether severance is appropriate for wind, and the advantages to
having a severable wind estate.
A. Wind as a Natural Resource
Finding wind to be a natural resource would position the Legis-
lature to mitigate wasteful practices in wind harvesting, such as
turbine wake interference."o The Texas Constitution states that
"[t]he conservation and development of all of the natural re-
sources of this State . . . , and the preservation and conservation of
all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby de-
clared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all
such laws as may be appropriate thereto."" The Texas Supreme
Court has interpreted this amendment narrowly, finding that regu-
latory power over natural resources is within the sole purview of
the Legislature.92 Thus, while courts may help define the category,
93
only the Legislature may pass laws regulating natural resources.
Wind is similar to some of the natural resources that the Legisla-
ture already regulates under the Texas Constitution. The Texas
Natural Resources Code contains various titles and can be taken as
a list of natural resources in Texas. These titles include: Public
Domain, Oil and Gas, Mines and Mining, Geothermal Energy and
Associated Resources, Timber, Heritage, Caves, and Wetlands.99
The Texas Water Code is separate from the Natural Resources
Code and includes storm and floodwater, rivers and streams, and
groundwater, which are also considered natural resources in Tex-
96as.
Oil and gas, mining, geothermal energy, and associated activities
are analogous to wind in that these resources are, or at least can
be, used to generate energy, and the Legislature has sought to reg-
ulate them. Moreover, wind is sometimes compared in its
behavior to surface water, thus making it similar to surface water
90. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835.
91. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
92. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tex. 1999)
("This constitutional amendment ... made clear that in Texas, responsibility for the regula-
tion of natural resources ... rests in the hands of the Legislature.").
93. See id.
94. SeeTEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. tits. 2-6, 9-10, 12 (West Supp. 2010).
95. Id.
96. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 1.003, 35.001 (West 2008).
97. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837 ("[T]he development of wind power, like min-
eral development, benefits the public as a whole by providing it with an energy source.").
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that is managed as a natural resource." Finally, the law governing
ownership of groundwater is offered as a basis for wind owner-
ship."9 If this law is applicable to wind, then it would imply that, like
groundwater, wind should be considered a natural resource under
the Texas Constitution." If wind were recognized as a natural re-
source, "[t]he Legislature could promulgate regulations to ensure
the proper and orderly development of wind power and perhaps
maximize the amount of energy generated in the windiest parts of
[the] state."0 To this end, once wind is codified as a natural re-
source, the Legislature can pass laws to establish the contours of
wind ownership rights, and to make those rights severable, thus
providing landowners with a resource they can develop, market,
and protect in the courts.
B. Justifications for a Property Interest in Wind
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas seemed to recognize a right
to wind access as early as 1904.102 In Choctaw, Oklahoma & Texas
Railway Co. v. True, the court found that it was proper to allow evi-
dence that would support a plaintiffs claim for damages resulting
from the construction of an embankment that blocked wind flows
to the plaintiffs windmill.' 3 Although the True Court did not spe-
cifically recognize a right to wind access,'m and the case has never
been cited for that proposition, one commentator has argued that
the court at least recognized a value to wind access."'e Yet, given the
ambiguous language and potentially limited holding of the case,
more is needed as a legal justification for wind ownership.
Commentators and case law have offered several justifications
for the Texas Legislature to recognize a property interest in wind.
These include a theory of unified fee ownership, a theory of ferae
naturae (wild animals), and the law governing groundwater."' In
98. See, e.g., Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 2009).
99. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 9-11.
100. See id. at 11.
101. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835.
102. Choctaw, Okla. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. True, 80 S.W. 120,121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See Thaddeus Baria, Comment, Up the Creek With a Paddle. Water Doctrine as a Basis
for Small Wind Energy Resource Rights, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 141, 153 (2009) (citing Choctaw,
Okla. & Tex. Ry., 80 S.W. at 121).
106. See Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 2009) (comparing the
right to harvest wind energy to the right to appropriate surface water and groundwater un-
der New Mexico's prior appropriation regime); Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6-11; supra note
24 (defining groundwater).
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addition, the surface water'o' regimes in the United States, riparian-
ism and prior appropriation,"o" could also serve as a basis for wind
ownership.'" Texas originally subscribed to riparianism, but over
the years the water rights regime evolved until an exclusively prior
appropriation regime was adopted to unify the water rights system
and provide clarity to competing water claims."0 This section will
explore the suitability of these theories to the development of wind
ownership.
1. "Ad Coelum": Unified Fee Ownership
Texas subscribes to the unified fee ownership theory"'-the first
of four theories addressed in this Note that justify establishing a
property interest in wind. At common law under ad coelum,"2 or
unified fee ownership theory, the landowner owns everything from
the center of the earth to sky." The only restriction on this rule is
that the surface owner's use of the land cannot interfere with air
travel."'4 "[A] landowner's exclusive dominion over his or her adja-
cent airspace is usually considered to extend only to the altitude of
the owner's existing and effective reasonable use of the land.""0
Thus the argument proceeds that because "surface landowners
have the right to use and develop the empty space above their
property, . . . the right to the wind that blows over a property is
held by the surface owner of that property."" 6 Adopting this theory
107. See supra note 27 (defining surface water).
108. Riparianism allows owners of land adjacent to natural water bodies to make rea-
sonable use of water from those bodies on the adjacent tract of land. Prior appropriation
allows anyone to acquire a water right by diverting unclaimed water and applying it to bene-
ficial use, subject to those appropriators first-in-time having seniority over later
appropriators in times of shortage. See City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97,
101-03 (Tex. 2006).
109. See, e.g., Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335; Baria, supra note 105, at 162-79.
110. See City of Marshall, 206 S.W.3d at 101-03 (discussing the history of Texas' surface
water law).
111. See Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).
112. "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos-.to whomsoever the soil be-
longs, it is theirs up to the sky and down to the depths." Chavarria, supra note 29, at 1 (citing
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 ("Land hath also, in its legal signification, an
indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, eOus est usque ad coelum, is the
maxim of the law . . . .")).
113. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 7.
114. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-66 (1946).
115. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 834 (citing Shronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964)).
116. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 83, at 17.
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would allow landowners to build wind turbines on their properties
to make productive use of wind.'17
However, standing alone, the unified fee theory is insufficient to
establish a property right in wind. Under the unified fee theory,
the grant of a right to the airspace above one's property is not
equivalent to a property interest in the wind that blows over one's
property."8 To establish a property interest in wind, a landowner
needs both a right to develop the airspace above his property, and
a basis for a right in the wind as it moves across his property."9 The
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v.
Rounsaville followed this logic in finding that a group of ranchers
had a right to the rainfall that fell from the clouds over their prop-
erty.20 The court held that the ranchers' right to collect rainfall was
based on the right of the landowners to the airspace above their
property, as well as the common-law doctrine of natural rights.
Similarly, wind ownership will require some basis for ownership
beyond the right of a landowner to the airspace above his proper-
ty.122
If a landowner possesses nothing more than an interest in the
airspace above his property, nuisance law could give his neighbors
a competing right to keep the airspace above their property "free
from certain undesirable substances and effects."12 3 The question
would then be whether the benefit to the landowner from occupy-
ing his airspace with wind turbines is greater than the harm that
the loss of scenic views causes to his neighbor."' This balance
would likely lead to different outcomes from case to case, perpetu-
ating the uncertainty in the wind rights regime that impedes
investments in wind power. The potential for these types of con-
flicts shows that without a basis for ownership in the air moving
through a landowner's airspace, the unified fee theory is insuffi-
cient on its own to establish a property interest in wind for
117. See Rule, supra note 46, at 222.
118. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 8.
119. See id. ("The proper question to ask concerning wind, once it breaks the ownership
plane of Blackacre, is when is it capable of being owned[,] i.e. at the time it crosses the
plane of Blackacre or after it has been reduced to possession (electricity).").
120. 320 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), affid, Sw. Weather Research, Inc. v.
Jones, 327 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. 1959).
121. Id. ("We believe that the landowner is entitled ... to such rainfall as may come
from clouds over his own property that Nature, in her caprice, may provide.").
122. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 7-8.
123. Rule, supra note 46, at 222.
124. See id. But see Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 512-13 (Tex. App.
2008) (finding that a wind farm's aesthetic impact on its surroundings was not sufficient to
support a nuisance claim).
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commercial wind energy development.2 The next issue, then, is
what theories of property ownership could support a property in-
terest in moving air as it traverses a tract of land.26
2. "Ferae Naturae": Ownership of Wild Animals
One possible analogy to establish ownership of wind blowing
over a landowner's land and through his airspace is the theory of
ownership of wild animals.'2 1 In Texas, wild animals, or animals ferae
naturae, are property of the State until they "are legally removed
from their natural liberty and made the subjects of man's domin-
ion."012 Wild animals are not confined to any one area, and their
specific location and movements are not predictable to a very pre-
cise degree.2 Similarly, although predicting wind speed and
direction in a given area at a given time is possible, accurate
weather predictions are limited to about three days in the future.9 0
Thus, given similarities in the general unpredictability of both wild
animals and wind, the laws governing the ownership of wild ani-
mals could be a useful tool to help landowners establish a property
right in wind. 3'
Although a landowner can acquire an ownership interest in a
wild animal, that interest exists only as long as the animal is cap-
tured, removed from nature, confined, and under the landowner's
control. 32 The right is qualified in the sense that if the animal es-
capes back into the wild, the landowner loses his right over it and
must capture it again to reestablish ownership.' Physical capture
and possession of the wind, however, is not possible.'" "To reduce
wind to 'possession' appears to require that it be focused on driv-
ing the fins of a windmill which turn a generator and ultimately
generates electricity."' Similar to a wild animal, the wind escapes
after turning the blades of the turbine, and the landowner's right is
125. See Rule, supra note 46, at 222-23.
126. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 8-9.
127. See id.
128. State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 41 (Tex. App. 1994) (emphasis added).
129. Hogwood, supra note 25, at 8.
130. Id. at 9.
131. See id. at 8-9.
132. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d at 41-42.
133. Id. at 41.
134. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 6.
135. Id.; cf HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 83, at 17 (" 'Capture' of the wind would
be the right to convert or the actual conversion of the wind to [wind] energy." (emphasis add-
ed)).
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lost, but it would be subject to capture for the next turbine or wind
farm. 186
Under the wild animal theory, the State owns all wild animals in
trust for the benefit of the people.137 Applying the wild animal the-
ory to wind, the State would own the wind in trust for the benefit
of the people before capture and after the wind escaped."' By own-
ing all animals ferae naturae in trust for the people, the State has
authority to regulate them and to determine how they can be legal-
ly captured.'39 The same would arguably be the case for wind; thus,
the State could regulate wind whether or not it is classified as a
natural resource under the Texas Constitution. 40 This would imply
that to capture wind legally, one would have to convert it to wind
energy in compliance with any State-imposed regulations. 4'
The Texas courts' longstanding acceptance of the theory of ferae
naturae makes it difficult to apply to wind rights. The notion of
State ownership of wild animals for the benefit of the people, and
its corresponding duty to regulate takings of wild animals, is one of
the oldest tenets of the common law.142 If courts narrowly interpret
the contours of State trusteeship as limited to wild animals, the ex-
tension of State trusteeship to wind is unlikely to survive judicial
scrutiny. Thus, if the Legislature were to base wind ownership on
the wild animal theory, it would be prudent to first pass a law codi-
fying wind as a natural resource to ensure its regulatory authority
over the resource.4
3. Groundwater: The Rule of Capture
Another theory to justify ownership of the wind blowing over a
landowner's property and through his airspace is the law of
groundwater, which in Texas means the rule of capture.'44 In Texas,
the landowner owns all groundwater under his property, ' subject
136. Cf Bartee, 894 S.W.2d at 41 ("This qualified right is lost, however, if the animal re-
gains its natural liberty." (citing Wiley v. Baker, 597 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980))).
137. See id. at 41-43.
138. Cf id. at 41 (explaining that, under Texas law, an individual can possess a property
right in captured wild animals, but the State owns wild animals when they are free and roam-
ing both before they are captured and after they escape capture).
139. Id. at 42-43.
140. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 9.
141. See id.
142. See Bartee, 894 S.W.2d at 41.
143. See supra Part IIA; infra Part IIIA.
144. SeeHogwood, supra note 25, at 9-11.
145. See Pecos Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d
503, 505-06 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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to the rule of capture.'46 This means that the landowner has a right
to capture and reduce the water to possession unless done with the
purpose of maliciously injuring his neighbor or wasting the water.147
Absent specific regulation, applying this doctrine to wind would
allow a landowner to "have the right to capture"' all of the wind
that crossed the landowner's property, barring malicious or waste-
ful use. This would be the case even if the wind were prevented
from crossing to a neighboring property, thereby interfering with
the neighboring landowner's ability to capture the wind."'
The law of groundwater could establish an ownership interest in
wind. Because groundwater is subject to regulation as a natural re-
source under the Texas Constitution, regulating wind under this
regime would also require finding that wind is a natural resource
to affirmatively grant the Legislature regulatory authority. Alt-
hough groundwater is a natural resource, the Legislature
historically has not sought to regulate its capture to mitigate waste
or for any other reason. 5' Thus, applying the rule of capture to
wind rights does not guarantee that the Legislature will regulate
wind to prevent waste.
As demonstrated in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc.,
Texas landowners should expect little, if any, relief from courts to
protect against wasting wind energy under a rule of capture re-
gime; instead they must turn to the Legislature for protection. In
Sipriano, the plaintiffs were a group of landowners who sued a wa-
ter bottler that had drilled a well and pumped groundwater at a
site near the plaintiffs' property, causing their wells to become de-
146. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835 ("[A] surface owner has the right to take all of the
percolating water he or she can capture from beneath the land." (citing Sipriano v. Great
Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999)).
147. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., I S.W.3d 75, 75-77 (Tex. 1999);
see also Hogwood, supra note 25, at 10 ("Ownership is a pre-requisite to reducing percolating
waters to possession. However, unless done maliciously or wastefully, the act of reducing
percolating waters to possession can be done even if such possession actually harms the
adjoining surface owner(s) and prohibits him from utilizing the water under his lands.").
148. See supra text accompanying note 135 (defining capture of wind).
149. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 83, at 17.
150. Chavarria, supra note 21, at835; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 11.
151. See Dylan 0. Drummond, Comment, Texas Groundwater Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: A Compendium of Historical Approaches, Current Problems, and Future Solutions Focusing on the
High Plains Aquifer and the Panhandle, 4 TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 173, 205-06 (2003);
Philip Dunlap, Comment, Border Wars: Analyzing the Dispute over Groundwater Between Texas
and Mexico, 12 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 215, 221-22, 226-27 (2006). See generally Marvin W.Jones
& Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A Contrived Battle for State Control of
Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 578 (2009) (noting that ownership of groundwater subject
to the rule of capture was decided in 1840 when the Republic of Texas adopted the com-
mon law of England, and that the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the same
since 1904).
152. 1 S.W.3d at 79-80.
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pleted.53 The Texas Supreme Court upheld the rule of capture, as
well as the court's historic refusal to develop a doctrine of waste
that would protect the plaintiffs right to access the water underly-
ing his property.54 According to the Sipriano court, the Texas
Constitution charges the Legislature alone with preserving the
state's natural resources.' This ruling demonstrates that the rule
of capture, when applied to wind and unsupported by a doctrine of
waste, could lead to waste, since courts lack authority to prevent
turbine wake turbulence, suboptimal siting of wind farms and of
turbines on individual wind farms, and forms of deliberate inter-
ference with wind flows by upwind neighbofs.16 Thus, if the State is
to recognize wind ownership subject to the rule of capture, the
Legislature must be willing to regulate wind as a natural resource
to the extent necessary to mitigate wasteful practices that lead to
suboptimal production levels.5 7
4. Surface Water Regimes
The law governing the right to use surface water is another the-
ory supporting a property interest in wind.'" Riparianism and prior
appropriation, discussed earlier in this Note, are the two theories
of law governing surface water.'55 However, there are at least two
reasons that neither riparianism nor prior appropriation can de-
termine whether there is a property interest in wind. First, these
regimes govern the use rather than the ownership of surface wa-
ter.'" Also, both of these regimes assume the existence of water
that flows in a defined watercourse, either a river or a lake.'" Alt-
hough wind flows exhibit patterns and some areas are predisposed
153. Id. at 75-76.
154. Id. at 80-81.
155. Id. at 77 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a)); see also Chavarria, supra note 21, at
835; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 11.
156. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
157. Cf Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 82 (Hecht, J., concurring) ("The extensive regulation of
oil and gas production proves that effective regulation of migrant substances far below the
surface is not only possible but necessary and effective. In the past several decades it has
become clear ... that it is not regulation that threatens progress, but the lack of it.").
158. See, e.g., Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 2009) (comparing
the right to harvest wind energy with the right to appropriate surface water and groundwa-
ter under New Mexico's prior appropriation regime); Baria, supra note 105, at 162-79
(arguing that the riparian rights doctrine would serve as a useful basis for wind rights in
small-scale wind systems).
159. See supra note 108.
160. SeeJOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 27, 124-26 (4th ed. 2006).
161. See id. at 28, 124.
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to receiving greater wind flows than others, the course of the wind
flow is variable and not confined to any sort of physical boundary.
Thus, two of the principle assumptions underlying the surface wa-
ter regimes are absent when applied to wind ownership.
Texas surface water law has evolved over time. Texas subscribed
to riparianism when it first adopted the common law of England,
but gradually evolved toward a prior appropriation regime until
the passage of the Water Rights Adjudication Act in 1967, which
officially adopted prior appropriation. 63 Riparianism has two prob-
lems as a basis for wind ownership in Texas. First, Texas no longer
follows riparianism, so there is no current basis for it in Texas case
law or statutes. 16 Moreover, riparianism allows water rights only for
those whose tracts of land abut a natural body of water.'65 Thus, if
riparianism were applied to wind, everyone would potentially be a
"wind riparian" because wind blows over everyone's estate.'" In
cases of interference, competing rights to wind access, or nuisance
claims, the argument would then essentially deal with little more
than the application of riparian law's reasonable use criteria to
competing rights of wind access.6 7 The application of reasonable
use criteria would be similar to the current regulatory void of wind
rights and wind regulation, in which disputing parties have to re-
sort to policy arguments regarding whose right to wind or air
access is more reasonable or more beneficial to society.66
There are not yet any published state appellate or Texas Su-
preme Court cases discussing the applicability of prior
appropriation to wind ownership. A recent New Mexico case,
Romero v. Bernell, made the comparison and found that the right to
harvest wind is similar to the right to appropriate water in that the
right vests when wind or water is used for a "useful" or "beneficial
162. See COMBS, supra note 57, at 159 (discussing the abundance and variability of the
wind).
163. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.301-.303 (West 2008); see also City of Marshall v. City
of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97, 101-04 (Tex. 2006) (discussing the history and evolution of
water law in Texas); supra note 108 and accompanying text (defining riparianism and prior
appropriation).
164. See City of Marshall, 206 S.W.3d at 102-04.
165. See id. at 10102.
166. See Baria, supra note 105, at 165 (describing wind under a riparian theory as
"communal 'property' " in making an argument for the riparian doctrine as a suitable basis
for wind ownership for small-scale wind energy systems).
167. See id. at 164-78 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979)) (apply-
ing, to questions about the reasonable use of wind, the reasonable use factors listed in
section 850A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding whether the riparian use of
water is reasonable).
168. See, e.g., Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 510-13 (Tex. App. 2008)
(discussing a claim for nuisance based on a wind farm's aesthetic impact).
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purpose."'" Yet the court's analysis ignores the potential impact
that a first-in-time focus could have on wind rights.7 0
Protecting older uses of wind at the expense of newer uses of
wind could be counterproductive, especially where newer uses are
more efficient than the existing uses."' Under such a system, a po-
tential downwind wind farm may have more production capacity
than its upwind neighbor, but if the upwind neighbor predated the
downwind installations, the downwind appropriator would have no
recourse against the upwind neighbor for impeding wind flows."
Conversely, if a potential wind farm site is upwind of an existing
installation, this upwind site could not be developed if it would in-
terfere with the existing downwind installations. 73 In either case,
whether the potential wind farm is upwind or downwind, seniority
would be the governing rule; the amount of wind energy produced
would be less than the potential maximum efficient level. Thus,
applying the prior appropriation doctrine to wind energy would
not further Texas' policy goal of maximizing the development the
state's energy resources.
C. The Severability Debate
If Texas recognizes a property interest in wind that is incident to
the surface estate, the question then becomes whether that interest
is severable.174 Courts in California and New Mexico seem to rec-
ognize the severability of wind,175 but no Texas court has addressed
the issue.17" Notably, courts and legislatures throughout the United
States have not cited these cases as precedent on the issue of wind
severability.'77 On the contrary, North Dakota and South Dakota
have statutorily prohibited severing wind rights from the surface
169. 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 2009).
170. See DuVivier, supra note 19, at 96 (noting the problems that arise when applying a
first-in-time focus to wind rights).
171. See id. ("Thus, a prior appropriation system focuses on first-in-time, but does not
necessarily consider the value of uses or encourage maximum benefit for the most peo-
ple.").
172. See id.
173. Cf. id. (discussing how a prior appropriation regime would favor access for less ef-
ficient upwind facilities if they were constructed prior in time to more efficient downwind
facilities).
174. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-36 (D.N.M. 2009); Contra
Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 275-78 (Ct. App. 1997).
176. See Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5
TEx. J. OIL GAs & ENERGY L. 165, 177 (2009-2010) ("There is no legal precedent in Texas
either supporting or rejecting the validity of a severance of wind rights.").
177. See DuVivier, supra note 19, at 89.
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estate. 17 Commentators have also discussed wind severance and the
rights that should accompany a severed wind estate.'7 ' At first
glance, it seems there is no clear answer as to whether wind inter-
ests should be severable from the surface estate in Texas."'s
Examining cases decided outside of the state, however, is a useful
starting point for discussing the merits of wind severance.
The Court of Appeal of California was first to discuss whether
wind rights can be severed from the surface estate.'' Contra Costa
Water District v. Vaquero Farms, Inc. involved an eminent domain suit
in which the plaintiff, Contra Costa Water District, as part of a pro-
ject to construct a reservoir, condemned part of the defendant's
land, Vaquero Farms, Inc., where wind turbines were located.'" In
an effort to pay less during the condemnation proceedings, the
Contra Costa Water District reserved the wind rights to Vaquero
Farms and only condemned the underlying land.'83 On appeal, the
court narrowly defined the issue: "When a public entity acquires
property through eminent domain, are the windpower rights ca-
pable of segregation or are they so affixed to the underlying land
that they must be acquired by the condemning authority?"' 4 The
court compared the severance of wind to the severance of subsur-
face minerals, specifically oil and gas, and noted that capturing
both hydrocarbons and wind ultimately results in generation of
energy.85 Although the court held that the Contra Costa Water Dis-
trict could reserve the wind rights, the holding was based at least in
part on the "solidly-established tenet of California law that a con-
demnation of property for public use need not be unqualified,
total, and unconditional."' Thus, while some commentators cite
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 17-04-04 (2009) ("[A]n interest in a resource located on a tract
of land and associated with the production of energy for wind power on the tract of land
may not be severed from the surface estate."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-13-19 (2004) ("No
interest in any resource located on a tract of land and associated with the production or
potential production of energy from wind power on the tract of land may be severed from
the surface estate ... .)
179. Compare DuVivier, supra note 19, at 85-98 (arguing that mineral severance is an in-
appropriate model for wind severance), with Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4-10 (discussing
the practice of wind severance in Texas, why caution is warranted when one undertakes to
sever wind rights, and the rights that should be included in a wind deed), and Hogwood,
supra note 25, at 8 (stating that Texas courts would likely uphold a wind severance that was
crafted in a fashion similar to mineral severance).
180. See, e.g., DuVivier, supra note 19, at 97-98.
181. See Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (Ct. App.
1997).
182. Id. at 273- 7 4.
183. Id. at 275.
184. Id. at 276.
185. Id. at 278.
186. Id.
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the court's comparison to mineral severance and interpret the
holding broadly as support for the severance of the wind estate, 87 it
is equally plausible to limit the holding to reservations made dur-
ing condemnation proceedings. "
In March 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico addressed the issue of wind severance in Romero v. Bernel' 9
Romero involved a partition of a plot of land owned by the parties as
tenants in common.90 The respondent argued that the land could
not be partitioned because the principal value of the land was in
wind farm development, and that "wind power rights, like mineral
rights, are not capable of being partitioned."'9 ' Breaking with the
logic of Contra Costa, the court rejected the analogy to mineral sev-
erance and instead compared wind to water.9 2 In making this
comparison,'9 3 the court found that "[t]he right to 'harvest' wind
energy is, then, an inchoate interest in the land which does not
become 'vested' until reduced to 'possession' by employing it for a
useful purpose."'9 4 The court then cited Contra Costa for the propo-
sition that "[o]nly after [wind] is reduced to actual wind power can
wind energy then be severed and/or quantified."9 5 Because there
were no windmills on the property, the court concluded the wind
interest was not vested and ordered the property's division.'9 6 Thus,
although Romero admits the possibility of a severable wind estate,
that estate only includes wind that is actually captured; it does not
include any speculative or inherent right in wind itself.9 7
These cases could support the existence of a severable interest
in captured wind that is converted to wind energy.' The first ad-
vantage of recognizing the wind estate would be to clear up the
uncertainty regarding the severance of wind rights in existing
187. See, e.g., Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835-36; Hogwood, supra note 25, at 7-8.
188. See, e.g., DuVivier, supra note 19, at 88.
189. 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-36 (D.N.M. 2009).
190. Id. at 1334.
191. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 1334-35; see also supra text accompanying note 169.
193. New Mexico applies prior appropriation to both its surface water and its ground-
water, and an interest in groundwater is severable. DuVivier, supra note 19, at 97-98; see also
supra text accompanying notes 169-173 (discussing Romero and the potential application of
prior appropriation to the harvest of the wind).
194. Romero, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
195. Id. (citing Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272
(Ct. App. 1997)).
196. Id. at 1335-36.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1334-36; Contra Costa Water Dist., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277-78; see also Cha-
varria, supra note 21, at 837 (stating that Contra Costa allows for the severance of wind
rights).
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leases.19 Moreover, with the decline of agriculture, the economy of
many parts of West Texas could benefit from the income-
producing potential of wind power.2on A property interest in wind
would allow a landowner to invest in developing his wind re-
sources, or to lease them, thus providing him with an additional
source of income.2 Severance would allow landowners to sell their
wind rights without having to sell their entire estate, 2 making wind
a freely transferable and marketable commodity. This would pro-
vide landowners with another potential source of income. 2 ' This
would also encourage the development of wind energy because it
would provide another means to transfer wind rights to those who
value them the most and have the resources to develop them.204
There is one additional benefit to severability: the current lack
of legislation puts landowners at a competitive disadvantage in try-
ing to negotiate complicated long-term lease arrangements with
wind energy developers. Given the current state of the law, the only
protection the landowners have in such agreements is the contract
itself 20 Wind severance and the accommodation doctrine206 be-
tween surface owners and the wind estate would provide a default
rule to which landowners could resort to protect their existing sur-
207face uses.
For wind severance to facilitate wind energy development, wind
estate holders must be able to develop their wind estates by
"hav[ing] rights and privileges similar to those held by the mineral
estate holders."208 In Texas, the five elements of the mineral estate
include the rights to (1) develop, (2) lease, (3) receive bonus pay-
ments, (4) receive delay rentals, and (5) receive royalty
199. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4.
200. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 525-26 (discussing how landowners in rural areas
would benefit from the additional income that wind farms would generate in the form of
lease or royalty payments); see also HoUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 83, at 8 (noting the
economic impact of wind development on rural counties and school districts in Texas).
201. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 525-26.
202. Cf Hager v. Stakes, 294 S.W. 835, 841 (Tex. 1927) (discussing how a landowner
who owns an undivided interest in his property can divest the minerals).
203. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837 ("Treatment of wind as a separate interest that
can be freely conveyed provides a landowner with a readily marketable commodity.").
204. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 10-11 (citing JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (8th ed. 2002)).
205. See supra note 89.
206. See infra notes 274-283 and accompanying text (defining the accommodation doc-
trine and applying it to the wind estate).
207. See Tex. Genco, LP v. Valence Operating Co., 187 S.W.3d 118, 121-23 (Tex. App.
2006) (discussing mineral severance and the accommodation doctrine in Texas).
208. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837; accord Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms,
Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct. App. 1997).
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payments. Similar to minerals, the right to develop the wind es-
tate would entail the right to use as much of the surface estate as is
necessary to construct and maintain turbines.210 Thus, a severable
wind estate with rights similar to a severable mineral estate would
facilitate further development of the wind energy industry in Tex-
as, making more wind energy available to the public. 21"
Applying traditional mineral severance principles to wind sever-
ance could be problematic because, in contrast with mineral rights,
wind rights require different surface uses and methods of extrac-
tion and because wind severance could create conflicts between
owners of wind, surface, and mineral estates.1 As the Romero court
indicated, wind is not found in a set place like minerals, but is
more analogous to flowing water or wild animals that roam on the
surface of the earth as opposed to being embedded in it.2' 3 Also,
wind farms make more extensive use of the surface than do most
forms of mineral extraction.214 Therefore, wind severance could
impede wind energy development in several ways. First, wind sever-
ance could complicate surface access because the surface owner
would not be involved in negotiations between the wind farm de-
veloper and the wind rights holder. If severed wind rights carry
an implied surface easement, then the wind farm developer would
not need to consult the surface owner regarding surface access and
would negotiate only with the holder of the wind rights.216 Thus,
the potential for disaccord and conflict would exist between the
surface owner and the wind developer.1 Moreover, because using
both the mineral estate and wind estate requires surface access,
there is potential for conflict if the mineral estate and the wind es-
tate have distinct owners.218 Because of these potential conflicts,
some wind investors question the wisdom of working with land-
owners who have severed their wind rights.2 '9 Arguably then, "the
traditional rationales for mineral severance do not support
209. Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986); see also Chavarria, supra note 29,
at 5-10 (describing these rights in the context of a wind severance).
210. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837 ("Since wind power, oil, and gas have the same
ultimate function, each should have the same protections.").
211. See id. at 837,840.
212. See DuVivier, supra note 19, at 85-86.
213. Romero v. Bernell, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-35 (D.N.M. 2009); accord Hogwood,
supra note 25, at 6.
214. See DuVivier, supra note 19, at 85.




219. See id. (citing Chavarria, supra note 29, at 5).
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severance as the most effective method for encouraging the devel-
opment of wind power.,2
20
Under both the wild animal theory and the rule of capture,
promoting the right to capture wind assumes that a landowner will
not place a greater value on wind free from capture.' One may
not desire to live next to a wind farm, and if wind rights are severa-
ble, one may attempt to purchase his neighbors' wind rights to
prevent the installation of a wind farm.2 In such situations, the
opportunity to harvest wind would be wasted, and society would be
denied the benefit of optimal levels of production of wind ener-
223
gy.
In sum, severability is a contentious issue, and the contours of a
severable wind estate could take various forms.22' Although Texas
should recognize the severability of wind rights, the Legislature
and the courts should make sure they do so in a way that continues
to promote the policy goal of non-wasteful growth in wind ener-
gy.225 Court decisions and statutes from other states should provide
guidance, but lawmakers in Texas ultimately will have to develop a
severable estate that balances the State's competing interests and is
based on Texas property law.
III. STATUTORY PROPOSAL &JUDICIAL GUIDANCE
To encourage wind energy development, the Texas Legislature
should first codify wind's status as a natural resource subject to
regulation under article XVI, section 59 of the Texas Constitu-
tion.2 Next, the Legislature should pass laws recognizing an
ownership interest in wind based on the rule of capture analogous
to the logic underlying the ownership of groundwater. This will
cement landowners' interests in wind and assure them of wind
property rights in which they can invest and seek the courts' pro-
tection. Finally, the Legislature should pass laws codifying that this
ownership interest is severable from the surface estate, thus estab-
220. DuVivier, supra note 19, at 86.
221. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 2-3.
222. See id. at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 118-125 (discussing the possibil-
ity of nuisance claims against wind farms).
223. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 2-3.
224. See DuVivier, supra note 19, at 97-98.
225. See id. at 98 ("Instead of applying past regimes to wind, elected officials should
study these models for pitfalls to avoid. Future legislation should be tailored to the unique
issues raised in developing each specific alternative renewable resource. By taling a proac-
tive approach, we can hope to convert inefficient practices of the past into the productive
alternative energy solutions of our future.").
226. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
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lishing a wind estate. Severance will benefit landowners by provid-
ing them with more options regarding the use of their properties,
and will promote development of the state's energy resources by
facilitating the transfer of wind rights to those who have resources
to develop them.
This section outlines the contours of statutes that will codify
wind as a natural resource and also establish a severable property
interest in wind analogous to a property interest in groundwater.
This section discusses the three points of the proposed statutory
reform-wind's status as a natural resource, wind ownership, and
severance of the wind estate-along with some of the rights and
provisions that should accompany these statutes. Finally, given that
Texas' Legislature is biennial and redistricting is likely to occupy
much of the Legislature's time during the 2011 session, ' Texas
courts may have to address these issues before the Legislature can
enact laws. Therefore, this section also discusses case law that Texas
courts can rely upon to find that wind is a natural resource and to
find a severable wind estate.
A. Wind as a New Natural Resource
The Texas Legislature should first pass laws recognizing that the
wind is a natural resource subject to regulation by the Legislature
228
pursuant to article XVI, section 59 of the Texas Constitution.
Passing a law would be the initial, and perhaps only, necessary step
to establish wind as a natural resource subject to legislative regula-
tion.2 " In the absence of legislative action or subsequent to it, the
Texas Supreme Court could find that wind is not a natural re-
source or that the current constitution does not contemplate wind
in its definition of natural resource.w In this scenario, a constitu-
tional amendment would be necessary to classify wind as a natural
resource in the text of article XVI.231
A statute or constitutional amendment codifying wind as a natu-
ral resource positions the Legislature to act as necessary to limit
227. See Mike Snyder, For 2010 Census, You Really Count, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2010, at
Al, All.
228. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
229. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 835 ("If wind were classified as a natural resource,
the Legislature would be authorized to pass laws regulating its use."); see also supra Part IIA.
230. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 11. The Texas Supreme Court could also find that
the wind is a natural resource, thus preempting the need for any action on the part of the
Legislature.
231. See TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1(a)-(c) (outlining the process of amending the Texas
Constitution).
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wasteful practices and maximize the development and production
of wind energy in Texas.3 This would enable the Legislature to act
to prevent turbine wake interference or intentional obstruction of
wind flows.23 ' The Legislature could pass laws mandating siting,
spacing, and setback requirements much in the same fashion that
the Railroad Commission mandated spacing requirements for oil
wells in East Texas during the 1930s.M In addition, if regulating
wind requires more time and attention than the Legislature has to
devote to it, the Legislature could delegate its regulatory authority
to a state agency, much as it did when it delegated regulatory au-
thority over oil and gas to the Railroad Commission.
Codifying wind as a natural resource may be essential to devel-
oping efficient practices in the wind energy industry because,
although applying the rule of capture to wind could establish a
property right in wind, the rule would do little to inhibit wasteful
practices. The rule of capture initially led to waste in the oil and
gas industry, and that waste began to diminish only after the Legis-
lature authorized the Railroad Commission to regulate oil and gas
production. Similarly, groundwater in Texas is also subject to the
rule of capture, and the lack of regulation has led to its deple-
tion.2 3' The potential for wasteful practices in harvesting wind
238exists. Although regulation to mitigate waste in wind energy de-
velopment may not currently be of great concern, finding wind to
be a natural resource will position the Legislature to pass laws to
mitigate waste in the event it becomes necessary to do so.
In conclusion, a statutory declaration that wind is a natural re-
source would further the policy, as expressed in Texas case law and
statutes, of fully developing Texas' energy resources.3 In addition,
232. Cf Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. 1999)
(Hecht,J., concurring) (noting that a lack of regulation of water threatens progress).
233. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 937-41, 945 (Tex. 1935)
(discussing and upholding an oil well spacing rule passed by the Railroad Commission).
235. See Hous. Auth. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (Tex. 1940) (upholding and
explaining the delegation of rulemaking authority to state administrative agencies in Texas);
see also Chris Reeder, Regulation by Contractors: Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Entities in
Texas, 5 TEX. TECHJ. TEX. ADMIN. L. 191, 201-03 (2004) (describing the history and current
status of the nondelegation doctrine in Texas).
236. See supra Part LA.
237. Sipriano, I S.W.3d at 81-82 (Hecht, J., concurring); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 153-157.
238. See supra Part I.C.
239. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904(a) (West Supp. 2009) ("It is the intent of the
legislature" to increase "generating capacity from renewable energy technologies" in Texas);
see also Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837, 840 ("[If] wind is classified as a natural resource,
Texas would have an obligation to maximize its development and formulate rules of law that
are consistent with the public policy of developing all of the state's natural resources, partic-
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the Legislature could use its regulatory authority to mitigate waste-
ful practices in wind harvesting and encourage further growth in
the wind energy industry.24 0 All Texans will ultimately benefit from
increased production of renewable, clean energy. This will help
stabilize and drive down the price of electricity for consumers
while lowering carbon emissions from electricity production.
B. Wind Ownership: Captuing Wind
Once wind is a natural resource subject to regulation, the Texas
Legislature should enact a law stating that landowners in Texas
possess property interests in the wind blowing over their land, sub-
ject to the rule of capture as defined under the law of
groundwater.4 Texas already subscribes to a unified fee theory of
ownership, but, as mentioned above, this on its own would not es-
tablish a property interest in harvested wind that is greater than a
neighbor's right to unobstructed wind flows. 243 Thus, something
more is needed to establish a property interest in wind.2" The logic
underlying a landowner's right to develop groundwater below the
surface provides the most useful analogy for supporting a property
interest in wind.45
The law of groundwater, although similar to the wild animal
theory, is superior because wind is more analogous to groundwater
than to wild animals. Both the wild animal theory and groundwater
law reach the same end and require the landowner to physically
ularly those which provide its citizens with a valuable source of energy." (footnote omitted));
Smith, supra note 59, at 295-97 (discussing the courts' reluctance to enjoin activities that
represent a clear expression of legislative policy, such as the operation of wind farms in
states like Texas that have enacted Renewable Portfolio Standards); Culley, supra note 64, at
972 (concluding that the holding in Rankin is appropriate, especially in light of the societal
benefits from wind energy development); cf Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506,
508-13 (Tex. App. 2008) (finding that Texas nuisance law does not create a cause of action
for impaired view of the landscape caused by wind turbines).
240. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837, 840.
241. SeeJeffry S. Hinman, The Green Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After Finan-
cial Crisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
35, 39-44 (2009); Kathryn B. Daniel, Comment, Winds of Change: Competitive Renewable Energy
Zones and the Emerging Regulatory Structure of Texas Wind Energy, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV 157,
174-75 (2009).
242. A court could also adopt and extend the holding from Choctaw, Oklahoma & Texas
Railway v. True, 80 S.W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904), to recognize a right to wind ownership.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-105. Yet given the ambiguous language of the case,
and its potentially limited holding, it would be best to also recognize a right to wind owner-
ship based on the law of groundwater. See infra notes 246-257 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Part II.B.1.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 123-126.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 246-251.
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reduce either the wild animal or the water to possession.246 Thus,
under either option, a landowner must also reduce wind to posses-
sion.2 ' Nevertheless, while wind may behave in some respects like a
wild animal,m it is not a wild animal. Wind is also not a subsur-
face mineral. Like sub-surface minerals, however, wind is a product
of physical forces that act on the earth, although the formation
process of wind is much shorter.2 o Moreover, some areas are pre-
disposed to receiving greater amounts of wind flow, much like how
areas near lakes and streams are predisposed to having a higher
groundwater table.25' Because wind is more analogous to ground-
water, the law of groundwater applies more naturally than the wild
animal theory to establishing a property interest in wind.
In applying groundwater law to wind, the rule of capture would
establish landowners' rights to develop the wind resources above
their respective properties,'2 but would not preclude third-party
actions, such as turbine wake interference or the deliberate ob-
struction of wind flows to downwind neighbors, from interfering
with wind energy development.253 To assure that the new law does
not also allow upwind neighbors to intentionally obstruct wind
flows to downwind wind farms, wind capture should be defined in
a way to indicate that it only entails the use of wind to generate
mechanical force or electrical energy. Defining capture in this way
would limit a neighbor's ability to claim a right to capture wind
246. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 1999); State
v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 41 (Tex. App. 1994); see also Hogwood, supra note 25, at 10 (noting
that under both theories of ownership, the landowner must reduce the wild animals or wa-
ter to possession).
247. See Hogwood, supra note 25, at 11.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
249. See Roderick E. Wetsel & H. Alan Carmichael, Current Issues in Wind Energy Law
2009, Am. Ass'N PROF. LANDMEN ANNUAL MEETING, 18 (June 17-20, 2009), available at
http://www.landman.org/WCM/Documents/Wetsel,%20Roderick%20E%20-
%20Current%20Issues%20in%2OWind%2OEnergy%2OLaw%2OPaper.pdf ("[W]ind is easily
distinguishable from wild animals.").
250. See supra note 10. Compare PAUL BOMMER, A PRIMER OF OILWELL DRILLING 60-64
(7th ed. 2008) (describing the process of oil formation) and Craig Freudenrich & Jonathan
Strickland, How Oil Drilling Works, HOwSTUerWORKS.COM (Apr. 12, 2001),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/oil-drillingl.htm (describing the
formation of oil from plants and animals that died in the seas between 10 million and 600
million years ago), with Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 517 (describing the formation of the
wind as a byproduct of the daily heating and cooling of the Earth's surface by the Sun).
251. Compare COMBS, supra note 57, at 168-70 (discussing the formation of the wind,
the factors that can affect wind patterns in a given area, and the areas of Texas with signifi-
cant wind power potential), with SAX ET AL., supra note 160, at 397-402 (describing
groundwater hydrology and the interaction between groundwater and surface water, and
also noting that withdrawing water from shallow aquifers near surface water bodies can af-
fect the surface water bodies).
252. See supra Part II.B.3.
253. See generally supra notes 64-9 and accompanying text.
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through the construction of windbreaks, embankments, or other
structures whose sole purpose is to impede wind flows and discour-
age wind energy development by downwind neighbors. This
definition will further the policy of fully developing Texas' wind
energy resources, while securing a property owner's ability to invest
in those resources.
Finally, basing wind ownership on the law of groundwater comes
with a caveat: taken alone, the theory provides a property interest
in wind, but is insufficient to prevent wasteful practices regarding
wind energy. Following its own example in successfully regulating
the oil and gas industry,'5 the State must similarly regulate the
wind energy industry to ensure efficient growth of wind power and
to mitigate any wasteful practices. Contrarily, to its detriment,
groundwater management in Texas has suffered from a lack of
regulation.2 5 6 In his concurrence in Sipriano, Justice Hecht noted
this dichotomy in stating that " [t]he extensive regulation of oil and
gas production proves that effective regulation ... is not only pos-
sible but necessary and effective. In the past several decades it has
become clear .. . that it is not regulation that threatens progress,
but the lack of it."257 Thus, given the Texas Supreme Court's defer-
ence to the Legislature regarding issues of natural resource man-
management, in establishing wind ownership, the Legislature must
also recognize the need to exercise its regulatory authority to miti-
gate wasteful practices in the production of wind energy when it
becomes necessary to do so.
C. The Wind Estate
Finally, the Legislature should pass laws establishing that the
property interest in wind incident to the surface estate is severable
from the surface estate. Wind severance has become common in
wind leases, but it is unclear whether courts will recognize wind
severance. 2 5 This casts doubt over the validity of such agreements
and has led some wind developers to prefer that landowners do
not sever wind rights.2 '5 Passing laws permitting wind severance
would eliminate these problems.
254. See Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837, 840; supra notes 89, 239 and accompanying
text.
255. See supra Part IA.
256. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht,
J., concurring).
257. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
258. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
259. See Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4-5.
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Following the logic of Contra Costa, the Texas wind estate holder
should have the same rights as the mineral estate holder.' In Tex-
as, the mineral estate holder has the rights to (1) develop, (2)
lease, (3) receive bonus payments, (4) receive delay rentals, and
(5) receive royalty payments.26' The first of these, the right to de-
velop, is often referred to as the right of ingress and egress.2 As
with the mineral estate, the holder of the wind estate would have
the right to enter the surface estate to the extent necessary to de-
velop and maintain wind turbines and their accompanying
infrastructure while taking all reasonable steps to accommodate
existing surface uses.26" Affording the wind estate the same rights as
the mineral estate flows from the argument that the public has an
interest in policies that promote the development of energy re-
sources.264 Since wind is a source of energy like oil and gas, the
protections afforded to the wind estate should be the same as those
265
afforded to the mineral estate.
It is likely that the mineral estate and the newly recognized wind
estate will conflict.2 " Traditionally, the mineral estate is the
dominant estate in Texas, and mineral owners have a right to
non-negligently use as much of the surface as is necessary even if it
interferes with existing surface uses.26 ' Thus it appears that
" [u] nder Texas law, an oil and gas operator, as the dominant estate
holder, can legally block a wind project that could generate a sub-
stantial amount of electricity."2 In this situation, the first recourse
could lie in private negotiation.6 If the mineral owner is exploit-
ing oil and gas deposits on a plot of land that would be profitable
for wind development, the holder of the wind rights, or the wind
developer on his behalf, will likely want to negotiate to buy the
mineral rights or establish a non-interference agreement with the
270mineral owner.
260. Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 278 (Ct.
App. 1997); Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837.
261. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837 (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex.
1986)).
262. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986).
263. See Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304-05 (Tex. 1943); Chavarria, supra note 21,
at 837 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808,811 (Tex. 1972)).
264. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837, 840.
265. See id. at 837.
266. See id. at 840.
267. See, e.g., Kenney v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961) (finding that the owner of the mineral estate was not liable to the owner of the sur-
face estate for subsidence caused by the non-negligent extraction of sulfur).
268. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 840.
269. See DuVivier & Wetsel, supm note 73, § 9.05.
270. See id. § 9.05[1]-[2], at 9-23 to-24.
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Yet negotiations will not always be successful.' Moreover, the
mineral estate may not be in development when the wind owner
wants to develop the wind resources, or if mineral severance took
place in the distant past, the mineral owner may be difficult to lo-
cate.7 Thus, given the dominance of the mineral estate, the possi-
possibility of the mineral estate owner subsequently interfering
with a wind project would cause concern for the developers of the
wind estate and could inhibit wind projects from going forward.7
To remedy situations in which negotiations with the mineral
owner fail or there is a fear of subsequent interference from the
mineral owner, the proposed statute should codify the accommo-
dation doctrine between the mineral estate, the surface estate, and
the wind estate.7 Under the accommodation doctrine, if the min-
eral owner has an alternative reasonable means to extract minerals
that would permit continued use of the surface by the surface
owner, then the mineral owner is required to pursue that alterna-
tive means.7 In codifying the accommodation doctrine as applied
to wind severance, the law should make clear that in the event that
the mineral owner decides in the future to exploit the subsurface
minerals, he must do so in a manner that does not interfere with
the existing wind power installations or the harvesting of wind to
generate wind power.76 This protects investment in the develop-
ment of the wind estate by eliminating investors' fear that the
production of wind energy in a given area could later be hampered
if the owner of the mineral estate decides to develop the mineral
resources.277 The statute would also force mineral owners to decide
whether they want to develop the mineral resources of their estate
before wind development on the overlying tract begins, or risk hav-
ing to accommodate the wind estate in the future if they wait to
271. See id.
272. Cf id. (discussing how a wind developer may try to negotiate a clause making the
surface estate dominant to the mineral estate if the mineral interest is not severed from the
surface estate, or alternatively, if the mineral estate is'severed, the wind developer may try to
contact the mineral estate holder and negotiate a waiver or noninterference agreement).
273. See id. § 9.05, at 9-22; cf Chavarria, supra note 29, at 4-5 (noting that given the un-
clear legal validity of wind severances, wind companies and their lenders tend to prefer that
landowners not sever wind rights from the surface estate).
274. See DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 73, at § 9.04[2]; see also Tex. Genco, LP v. Va-
lence Operating Co., 187 S.W.3d 118, 121-23 (Tex. App. 2006) (discussing the
accommodation doctrine in Texas).
275. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. 1974) (citing
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971)); see also Tex. Genco, LP, 187 S.W.3d at
121-22 (citing Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 870
S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. App. 1994)).
276. See DuVivier & Wetsel, supra note 73, § 9.04[2], at 9-21 to -22.
277. See id. at 9-20 to -22.
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develop their mineral resources.27" Again, this would promote the
overall development of energy resources in the state because in
either case, the land would be used to generate energy.7
Finally, as similarly applied to the mineral estate, the accommo-
dation doctrine in the statute establishing the severance of wind
rights should contain provisions requiring the wind estate to ac-
commodate any existing surface uses of the surface estate owner to
the extent reasonably possible. 280 This provision should, for exam-
ple, prevent wind developers from escaping liability in the event
they negligently bulldoze a farmer's house, and would also force
wind owners to take steps to minimize the effect of their activities
on grazing and farming.81 Some interference with such activities is
inevitable, but the goal should be to minimize that interference.28 2
This will permit the policies of promoting productive agricultural
use and developing the state's energy resources to coexist. *
CONCLUSION
Texas leads the United States in developing wind power infra-
structure and producing wind energy.28 4 The state has the largest
installed production capacity2"5 and the second largest potential
production capacity, behind North Dakota.8 Yet unlike Texas,
North Dakota has a small local demand for electricity and it is rela-
tively isolated from any major population centers;2 7 thus, North
Dakota lacks many of the inherent incentives to develop wind en-
ergy that Texas possesses.2 Texas is thus well-positioned to take the
278. See id.
279. Chavarria, supra note 21, at 837, 840.
280. See Tex. Genco, LP, 187 S.W.3d at 121-22 (citing Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W.2d at 353).
281. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 619-23 (Tex. 1971) (discussing the
circumstances under which a mineral owner would have to accommodate a surface owner's
agricultural uses).
282. See id. at 621 ("It is well settled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate ...
but that the rights implied in favor of the mineral estate [to use the surface] are to be exer-
cised with due regard for the rights of the owner of the servient estate.").
283. See id. at 622-23.
284. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
285. See Brent Stahl, Lisa Chavarria & Jeff Nydegger, Wind Energy Laws and Incentives: A
Survey ofSelected State Rules, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 99, 136 (2009).
286. D.L. ELLIOT ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AVAILABLE WINDY LAND AREA AND
WIND ENERGY POTENTIAL IN THE CONTIGUOUS UNITED STATES, app. B, tbl.B.1 (Aug. 1991),
available at http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/5252760-
ccuOpk/5252760.pdf (showing that North Dakota has the potential to produce an average
of 138,400 megawatts per year of wind energy, while Texas has the potential to produce an
average of 136,100 megawatts per year).
287. See Stahl, Chavarria & Nydegger, supra note 285, at 122-23.
288. See id. at 136.
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lead in developing wind law. Texas oil and gas law is one of the
most developed in the country: it is frequently applied in courts
outside the state, and is often chosen as the law to govern interna-
tional oil and gas transactions.28' Texas wind law, or more generally,
renewable energy law, could similarly become the national and in-
ternational standard. The laws enacted in Texas today to govern
the development of wind energy and the management of wind
could become the standard for the rest of the country, and the
world.
Lawmakers must be proactive in developing this body of law. It
was only after waste ravaged much of the Texas oil fields that law-
makers reacted and gave the Railroad Commission the tools it
needed to regulate waste of oil and gas. Renewable energy sources,
like wind, bring different kinds of concerns, but the underlying
policy goal of maximizing the state's energy resources is the same
with wind as it is with oil and gas. In addition, failing to fully use
renewable natural resources like wind will necessarily lead to
greater use of non-renewable natural resource such as oil and gas.
Thus, wasting the opportunity to harness wind causes waste of non-
renewable natural resources as well.
To further this policy goal, the Texas Legislature should pass
laws clarifying that wind is a natural resource under the Texas Con-
stitution. This will solidify the Legislature's ability to regulate wind
and recognize an ownership interest in wind. As with groundwater
law in Texas, this ownership interest should be based on the rule of
capture. Yet unlike groundwater, the Legislature should define
capture of wind in a way that excludes deliberate obstruction of
wind such as through windbreaks, embankments or other wind-
impeding structures, and includes harvesting wind to generate
electricity. Moreover, given that wind is a natural resource, the Leg-
islature must stand willing to pass future laws curtailing wasteful
practices, or to delegate its regulatory authority to an agency that
has the time and expertise to effectively regulate wind harvesting.
Finally, making the wind interest severable from the surface estate
and incorporating the accommodation doctrine will clarify the sta-
tus of such severances that have already occurred. It will also
promote development of the wind energy industry by providing
rural landowners with an interest they can develop, lease, or sell,
while allowing the traditional uses of the surface estate to continue
with minimal interference. Texas set the standard for energy law in
the past; these measures should position Texas to continue setting
standards in the future.
289. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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